Much Ado About Nothing?:
Local Resistance and the Significance of Sanctuary Laws
Alyssa Garcia*
INTRODUCTION
Immigration has become a hot topic of national discourse in recent
years. There have been calls on both sides of the aisle for immigration
reform policies. As such, this highly publicized political discussion has
evoked emotions, opinions, and actions from politicians and constituents
alike.
President Donald Trump has made his intention to deport “millions
and millions” of undocumented individuals vehemently clear.1 He has
outwardly voiced his opinion and intention to “stop . . . the killing
machine that is illegal immigration.”2 Additionally, he has made threats to
build a wall along the United States–Mexico border and has characterized
his approach as a “war on illegal immigration.”3 The administration has
already taken anti-immigrant action by attempting to end the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, stripping legal status
from over 800,000 DREAMers who participated in the program.4 In
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1. Amy Wang, Donald Trump Plans to Immediately Deport 2 Million to 3 Million Undocumented
Immigrants, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/
11/13/donald-trump-plans-to-immediately-deport-2-to-3-million-undocumented-immigrants/?utm_
term=.d4022a30418c [https://perma.cc/S2N9-P2YF].
2. Donald Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 10, 2015, 5:58 PM), https://twitter.
com/realdonaldtrump/status/630906211790102528?lang=en [https://perma.cc/P63S-YL7T].
3. Brenna Williams, Trump’s Immigration Policy (or What We Know About It) in 13 Illuminating
Tweets, CNN (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/26/politics/donald-trump-immigrationtweets/index.html [https://perma.cc/6JAB-UNHS].
4. Vanessa Romo, Martina Stewart & Brian Naylor, Trump Ends DACA, Calls on Congress to
Act, NPR (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/05/546423550/trump-signals-end-to-dacacalls-on-congress-to-act [https://perma.cc/M4TL-YMJH].
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January 2017, President Trump hastily gripped the nation in confusion,
fear, and upset when he issued Executive Order 13769, commonly known
as the Muslim Ban, which suspended individuals from several majorityMuslim countries from entering the United States.5
In response, organizations and advocates have risen up in opposition
to prevent mass deportation tactics and to protect the communities most
affected by these strong stances and tangible actions.6 Cities, states,
counties, and institutions have also taken proactive action in the matter by
enacting laws, commonly referred to as “sanctuary laws.” These laws limit
local government cooperation with federal immigration officials in
immigration enforcement.7
Sanctuary laws themselves have emerged as a central topic of
national discourse. During the 2016 presidential election, these laws came
to the forefront of the heated, controversial debate on immigration.8
President Trump has repeatedly made sanctuary laws the subject of his
political platform and his infamous tweets. During his campaign, thencandidate Trump constantly made statements expressing his opposition to
sanctuary jurisdictions specifically. In a campaign speech, he vowed that
if he was elected he would “block funding for sanctuary cities” and “end
the sanctuary cities.”9 During a radio interview, he again stated “sanctuary
cities are out . . . over” and that the “federal government is going to have
5. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), subsequently revoked and replaced
by Exec. Order No. 13780, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (March 6, 2017); Timeline of the Muslim Ban, ACLU
WASH., https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban [https://perma.cc/U8SA-Y4TF]; Press
Release, White House, Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-orderprotecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states-2/ [https://perma.cc/Q8BX-UCTF].
6. See generally UNITED WE DREAM, https://unitedwedream.org/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/
4YJ9-LQYL?type=image].
7. Sanctuary Cities: What and Where Are They?, DOPPLR http://www.dopplr.com/sanctuarycity-list/ [https://perma.cc/YN6Z-LD3E].
8. Throughout his presidential campaign, candidates on both sides heavily discussed sanctuary
cities. Then-candidate Trump used his stance on immigration as a central campaign platform through
advertisements, speeches, appearances, and formal statements. He repeatedly made threats to deport
undocumented immigrants, ban individuals who practice the Muslim religion from entering the
country, and cancel sanctuary cities. See generally Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities,
but What Are They?, CNN (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuary-citiesdonald-trump/index.html [https://perma.cc/3S8F-47H4]; Democrats ‘Complicit’ in All Murders by
Illegal Immigrants, DONALDJTRUMP.COM (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/media/
democrats-complicit-in-all-murders-by-illegal-immigrants [https://perma.cc/9J3A-J6NJ]; Promises
About Immigration on Trump-o-Meter, POLITIFACT http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
promises/trumpometer/subjects/immigration/ [https://perma.cc/5TV4-4KPA]. His opponent, Hillary
Clinton, also made her support for sanctuary cities clear to improve public safety. Suzanne Gamboa,
Clinton Campaign: Sanctuary Cities Can Help Public Safety, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2015),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/clinton-campaign-sanctuary-cities-can-help-public-safetyn389186 [https://perma.cc/T2FE-M54X].
9. Luhby, supra note 8.
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to get involved . . . very sharply.”10 He has also tweeted that sanctuary
areas were “crime infested & [a] breeding concept.”11
In the past, the federal government decided to overlook these
sanctuary laws and allow them to exist; however, as immigration evolved
into a leading issue in American politics, the Trump administration has
been more aggressive in immigration enforcement.12 Despite President
Trump’s attempts to take action, since sanctuary provisions are strictly
products of local and state governments, the federal government’s
oversight and control over them is significantly restricted by constitutional
principles, including the Spending Clause and the anti-commandeering
doctrine.13 Notwithstanding, the Trump administration has continued to
attack the validity of these state and local sanctuary laws through executive
action.
Within the first month of his presidency, President Trump issued
Executive Order No. 13768.14 The order threatened to withhold substantial
amounts of federal funding from “sanctuary jurisdictions.”15 The order
provides, in relevant part:
In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the Secretary,
in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law, shall ensure
that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373
(sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants,
except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the
Attorney General or the Secretary.16

The Attorney General was given authority to enforce and remove federal
funding eligibility from sanctuary jurisdictions.17 Attorney General Jeff
Sessions subsequently spoke in a press conference, stating that the
“Department of Justice will require jurisdictions seeking or applying for
Department grants to certify compliance with § 1373 as a condition for
10. Fred Barbash, Trump’s Campaign Words Stalk Him in Court on Sanctuary Cities, Just as in
Travel Ban Cases, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2017/03/30/trumpss-campaign-words-stalk-him-in-court-on-sanctuary-cities-just-as-intravel-ban-cases/?utm_term=.7289e12952dc [https://perma.cc/BE7H-7A4X].
11. Z. Byron Wolf, Editorial, Trump Blasts ‘Breeding’ in Sanctuary Cities. That’s a Racist Term,
CNN POLITICS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/18/politics/donald-trump-immigrantscalifornia/index.html [https://perma.cc/U6D3-BQMR].
12. See Pratheen Gulasekaram & Rose Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration Federalism:
A Dialectical Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1694 (2009).
13. Hugh Spitzer, “Sanctuary Cities” to Find Sanctuary in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts,
JURIST (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2016/12/Hugh-Spitzer-sanctuary-cities.php
[https://perma.cc/J9VL-2JE4].
14. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (West 2018).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (West 2018); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, reprinted in
8 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (West 2018).
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these awards.”18 The federal government has also continued to keep a
record of the jurisdictions it considers to be sanctuaries.19
In response to this direct attack on their policies, several
jurisdictions, including Seattle and San Francisco, have brought lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of the Executive Order under the
Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment.20 They claim that if enforced, the
Executive Order would subject them to a devastating loss of overall
funding, crippling budget decisions, and an egregious penalty.21 They also
allege that the Executive Order constitutes a violation of the Tenth
Amendment separation of powers and anti-commandeering doctrine.22
Amongst the heated political controversy and litigation, it is difficult
to ascertain whether these debates are momentous legal developments or
mere political grandstanding. On one hand, from their inception, sanctuary
laws have been symbolic political tools used by localities to protect
vulnerable individuals when the federal government has turned a blind
eye. On the other hand, as the lawsuits reveal, sanctuary laws raise
constitutional issues surrounding the tensions and assertions of power
between federal and state governments.
In this Comment, I explore the current constitutional discourse of
sanctuary laws and compare their various components. Part I provides
background on the basic policy components of sanctuary laws and modern
policies. Part II explores and compares the substantive legal and political
value of sanctuary laws. Within this section I will first assess the impact
of sanctuary policies on existing immigration and constitutional law. In
doing so, I will compare specific sanctuary jurisdictions involved in
litigation, Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago, and their likelihood of
withstanding preemption under existing doctrine. Then, I will discuss the
impact sanctuary laws may have on the Tenth Amendment. Second, I will
18. Jeff Sessions, Att’y General, Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions (Mar. 27,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarkssanctuary-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/BYR6-YVDY].
19. Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, slip op. at 3 (Oct. 19, 2017).
20. Id.; see also Barbash, supra note 10. See generally California v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-04701WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 13, 2017); City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept.
26 2017); City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-CV-04642-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Aug.
11, 2017); City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 2:17CV00497 (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 29, 2017).
21. City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-CV-04642-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Aug.
11, 2017); City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 2:17CV00497 (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 29, 2017).
22. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 2:17CV00497 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 29, 2017). After the filing of these lawsuits, Attorney General Sessions issued an internal
memo within the Department of Justice restricting the funding restrictions to only Department of
Justice and Department of Homeland Security grants, narrowing the general federal funding restriction
imposed by the original Executive Order. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y General, Dep’t. of
Justice, Memorandum for All Department Grant-Making Components (May 22, 2017).
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assess the political impacts of sanctuary laws. I explore whether they serve
as simple assertions of preexisting state powers or impactful legal
doctrines. This dichotomy of interpretation will reveal that sanctuary laws
are unlikely to yield any substantive change to current legal doctrine and,
instead, are more valuable as political symbols of local resistance. It is my
hope that this Comment provides a beacon of clarity amongst a foggy,
crowded coast of controversy, opinions, and debate to guide policymakers,
future sanctuary jurisdictions, and the public towards understanding the
role of these laws in our society.
I. SANCTUARY POLICIES: THEN AND NOW
A. The Origins
Although sanctuary laws have entered the forefront of national
discourse, they are no new phenomenon. The term “sanctuary” became
associated with immigration during the Central American Sanctuary
Movement back in the 1980s.23 Civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala,
fueled by government violence, human rights abuses, and social unrest,
forced over 468,000 people to flee and seek refuge in other countries,
including the United States.24 Meanwhile, the U.S. government provided
financial and combat training support to the Salvadoran government
regime.25 Yet, thousands of individuals seeking political asylum in the
United States were consistently denied legal entry by the U.S.
government.26 When the U.S. government continually rejected formal aid
to Central American refugees, U.S. churches and organizations took
matters into their own hands and declared themselves safe havens.27 They
provided refugees assistance in the form of basic necessities and shelter.28
These organizations felt that it was their moral duty to provide assistance
in light of wrongful actions by the U.S. government.29
Soon, states and localities agreed with the grassroots assistance
efforts and began to establish themselves as sanctuaries by enacting laws
that provided safeguards for these Central American refugees. Common
policies included prohibiting inquiry into immigration status and
23. Hector Perla & Susan Bibler Coutin, Legacies and Origins of the 1980s US-Central
American Sanctuary Movement, REFUGE, No.1 2009, at 7, 9–10.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Rose Cusion Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 139–40 (2008).
27. Karla McKanders, The Subnational Response: Local Intervention in Immigration Policy and
Enforcement, in COMPASSIONATE MIGRATION AND REGIONAL POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 33, 38
(Steven Bender & William Arrocha eds., 2017).
28. Id.
29. Villazor, supra note 26, at 133, 140.
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eliminating valid immigration status as a requirement for local
government benefits.30 Additionally, law enforcement was prohibited
from inquiring into immigration status to improve crime reporting. This
component, in particular, was found to not only protect immigrant
communities but also to improve public safety overall.31 These safeguards
were intended to provide assistance where the federal government would
not.32 Over time, these laws developed and evolved beyond their initial
purpose of protecting Central American refugees to protecting the greater
undocumented and immigrant communities.33
B. Modern Policies
The term “sanctuary” has evolved into an umbrella term for cities,
states, and localities with policies that limit their involvement with federal
immigration enforcement. Modern sanctuary laws primarily exist to
protect the national undocumented community for over 11.3 million
individuals.34 The political terrain in immigration has taken a drastic turn
due to many factors including the events of 9/11 and the population
increase of immigrants in many states.35 A rise in recent mass deportation
tactics and anti-immigrant sentiment across the country have fueled the
modern resurgence of sanctuary laws.36 The Trump Administration’s
crackdown on immigration enforcement incites a sentiment of anxiety and
fear among the millions of immigrants who are presently integrated within
American society.37 To address this concern, jurisdictions are emphasizing
the compassionate labeling of their localities as “welcoming” or
“sanctuary” jurisdictions.38
30. Id. Over twenty-three localities enacted sanctuary laws in this era including New York,
Massachusetts, and the city of Seattle. Id. at 140 n.59.
31. Id. at 142–43.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 143.
34. Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegalimmigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/YXK8-4NZB].
35. See McKanders, supra note 27, at 37; Villazor, supra note 26, at 143–44.
36. McKanders, supra note 27, at 38.
37. Krogstad et al., supra note 34.
38. Although this Comment directly addresses local and state governments, public and private
universities have also joined the movement. Across the country, dozens of universities have
implemented “sanctuary campus” policies, which protect their undocumented student population. See
Emily Deruy, The Push for Sanctuary Campuses Prompts More Questions Than Answers, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/11/the-push-for-sanctuarycampuses-raises-more-questions-than-answers/508274/ [https://perma.cc/WH7H-4CXK]; Cesar
Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Sanctuary Campuses Map, CRIMMIGRATION (Feb. 7, 2017), http://
crimmigration.com/2017/02/07/sanctuary-campuses-map/
[https://perma.cc/M2VP-YXPH].
See generally Natasha Newman, A Place to Call Home: Defining the Legal Significance of the
Sanctuary Campus Movement, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 122 (2017); The Immigration Response
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These jurisdictions decline to assist federal immigration enforcement
agencies in their duties of enforcing immigration law in various ways.
Sanctuary policies are not uniform; each jurisdiction maintains a unique
policy in resistance to the enforcement of federal immigration law. The
primary components of sanctuary policies are the (1) refusal to comply
with federal civil detainer requests unless required by court order, (2)
prohibition of inquiry by state and local authorities into immigration
status, and (3) bar on the use of local funds and resources to assist federal
enforcement.
Over 600 localities across the country have laws that limit
enforcement of immigration laws by state and local authorities.39 Three of
these jurisdictions, Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago, are explored here
because of their unique approaches to limiting local involvement with
immigration enforcement. All three led the country in the revival of
sanctuary laws and other immigrant-friendly initiatives; they are also
involved in recent litigation defending their policies against attack from
the federal government.40
1. Seattle
In 2016, then-Mayor Ed Murray issued an Executive Order
establishing Seattle as a “Welcoming City.” The Welcoming City label
allows Seattle to “consider all the policies and practices” needed to
“reduce the barriers of success that immigrants and refugees often face.”41
The order prioritizes Seattle’s commitment to “foster[ing] an environment
that makes it possible for Seattle to be a vibrant, global city
where . . . immigrant residents can fully participate in and be integrated
into the social, civic, and economic fabric” of the city.42 Thus, in discord
with the anti-immigrant sentiment incited by the federal government,

Initiative, Sanctuary Campus Toolkit Frequently Asked Questions, https://today.law.
harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Sanctuary-Campus-Toolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/HEN8W9CE].
39. Press Release, Nat’l Immigration Law Center, New State-by-State Interactive Shows How
Much Federal Funding Sanctuary Cities Could Lose at the Hands of President Trump’s Administration
(Mar. 2017), https://www.nilc.org/2017/03/07/state-state-interactive-on-possible-funds-loss/ [https://
perma.cc/9DJA-6Z5N]; see Laws, Resolutions and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting
Enforcement of Immigration Laws by State and Local Authorities, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR. (Dec.
2008), http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-LocalLawsResolutionsAnd
PoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ7H-Y6PL].
40. See generally cases cited supra note 20.
41. Cuc Vu, Office of Immigrant and Refugee Affairs, Seattle is a Welcoming City,
SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/iandraffairs/programs/welcomingcity [https://perma.cc/
2HWM-UUH3].
42. SEATTLE, WASH., EXEC. ORDER 2016-8 (Nov. 23, 2016).
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Seattle has chosen to reaffirm its commitment to protecting its immigrant
community.
The 2016 executive order contained four main sanctuary
components. First, it reaffirmed Seattle’s existing inquiry prohibition
stating that city employees shall not inquire into immigration status.
Second, it stated that city residents would have access to full city services
regardless of immigration status.43 Third, the order deferred civil detainer
requests to King County, which operates jails in place of the City of
Seattle.44 Finally, the order established an Inclusive and Equitable City
Cabinet composed of representatives from different city departments to
protect the civil liberties and rights of Seattle residents.45 The Cabinet is
comprised particularly of those with marginalized identities like
immigrants, refugees, low-income residents, LGBTQ residents, women,
and people with disabilities.46
Former Mayor Ed Murray’s Order was not the first city action in this
matter; the order built upon an existing city sanctuary policy. In 2003, the
city council passed Ordinance 121063, Seattle’s original sanctuary
policy.47 Ordinance 121063 was enacted in response to anti-immigrant
sentiment after the attack of 9/11. It prohibited city employees from
inquiring about immigration status, except when police officers have
reasonable suspicions that a person committed a felony-level crime or was
previously deported.48 The original Ordinance also contained a clause
stating that nothing in the Ordinance prohibits an employee from
cooperating with federal immigration authorities as required by law.49 This
savings clause is likely a direct reference to fulfill the requirement
of § 1373 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which will be discussed
later in this Comment.
2. San Francisco
San Francisco’s sanctuary law has evolved over the last few decades
into a comprehensive set of policies protecting the immigrant community.
In 1989, San Francisco passed the “City and County of Refuge” ordinance

43. Id.
44. Id. King County policy honors civil detainer requests from Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) only when they are accompanied by a criminal warrant. KING COUNTY, WASH.,
ORDINANCE 17886 (2014).
45. SEATTLE, WASH., EXEC. ORDER 2016-8 (Nov. 23, 2016).
46. Vu, supra note 41.
47. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 121063 (Jan. 28, 2003) (codified at SEATTLE, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 4.18.015 (2018)).
48. Id.
49. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.18.035 (2018).

2018]

Much Ado About Nothing?

193

establishing itself as a sanctuary jurisdiction.50 It was created as a response
to the federal government’s reluctance to aid Central American refugees
during the Central American Sanctuary Movement.51 Similar to Seattle’s,
the Ordinance serves to establish public trust and ensure that all San
Francisco residents, regardless of immigration status, have access to city
services and benefits.52
The City of Refuge Ordinance provides three ways in which the city
limits its participation in immigration enforcement. First, it prohibits city
employees from using city funds or resources to assist Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)––now Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE)––in the enforcement of immigration law. Second, it
prohibits city employees from “gather[ing] or disseminat[ing]” personal
information like the release status of individuals unless required by
another statute, regulation, or court decision. Third, it restricts law
enforcement officers from interacting with federal immigration officials.
It provides a non-exhaustive list of prohibited actions including (1)
assisting or cooperating in an official capacity with any federal
immigration investigation or detention; (2) requesting or disseminating
information regarding the release status of any individual or any other
personal information; (3) conditioning the receipt of city services or
benefits on immigration status; and (4) inquiring into immigration status
on any city application, questionnaire, or interview forms.53
The relevant part of the statute states:
(a) Assisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity, with any
investigation, detention, or arrest procedures . . . conducted by the
Federal agency . . . except as permitted under Administrative Code
Section 12I.3 . . . .

....
(c) Requesting information about, or disseminating information, in
one’s official capacity, regarding the release status of any individual
or any other such personal information . . . or conditioning the
provision of services or benefits by the City and County of San
Francisco upon immigration status, except as required by Federal or

50. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE No. 375-89 (Oct. 24, 1989) (codified at S.F., CAL., ADMIN.
CODE §§ 12H, 12I (1989)); Office of Civic Engagement and Immigrant Affairs, Sanctuary City
Ordinance, SFGOV, http://sfgov.org/oceia/sanctuary-city-ordinance-0 [https://perma.cc/6JTRV76L].
51. Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local
Government Cooperation with INS, 7 BERKLEY LA RAZA L.J. 50, 54 (1994).
52. Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 50.
53. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12H, 12I (2018).
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State statute or regulation, City and County public assistance criteria,
or court decision.
(d) Including on any application, questionnaire, or interview form
used in relation to benefits, services, or opportunities provided by the
City and County of San Francisco any question regarding
immigration status other than those required by Federal or State
statute, regulation, or court decision.54

Subsequently, in 2013, the “Due Process for All” Ordinance was
passed. This Ordinance added a provision to the existing restrictions that
prohibits civil detainer cooperation. It generally prohibits the practices of
giving ICE advance notice of a person’s release from jail and of honoring
ICE civil detainer requests. The relevant portion of the Ordinance
provides: “A law enforcement official shall not detain an individual on the
basis of a civil immigration detainer after that individual becomes eligible
for release from custody.”55
However, requests may be honored under certain circumstances. San
Francisco officials may detain an individual for federal authorities up to
forty-eight hours if the individual was convicted of a violent felony in the
past seven years and there is probable cause that the individual is guilty of
a violent felony.56 Additionally, city officials can give ICE advanced
notice of an individual’s release from custody if the individual has been
convicted of a violent or serious felony, a series of three felonies, or by a
ruling of probable cause that the individual is guilty of a felony.
Nonetheless, even if these circumstances are established, before
complying with ICE, the city officers must also consider these mitigating
factors: evidence of the individual’s rehabilitation, ties to the community,
contribution to the community, and participation in rehabilitation or social
service programs.57
Finally, the Ordinance provides a catch-all clause: “Law enforcement
officials shall not arrest or detain an individual, or provide any individual’s
personal information to a federal immigration officer, on the basis of an
administrative warrant, prior deportation order, or other civil immigration
document based solely on alleged violations of the civil provisions of
immigration laws.”58

54. Id.
55. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE No. 204-13 (Sept. 24, 2013) (codified as S.F., CAL., ADMIN.
CODE § 12I.3 (2018)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 12I.3(e).
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3. Chicago
Chicago also leads the nation with its immigrant-friendly initiatives.
The sanctuary policies in Chicago began back in the 1980s during the
Central American Sanctuary Movement.59 In 1985, then-Mayor Harold
Washington signed an Executive Order creating Chicago’s first sanctuary
law.60 The Order prohibited city employees from inquiring into
immigration status and mandated that city services be provided to all
residents regardless of immigration status.61 However, the policy was not
codified until 2006.62 The codified law specifically prohibits state officials
or agencies from requesting information about or investigating the
immigration status of any individual unless required by state statute,
federal statute, or court order.63 Additionally, it prohibits city officials
from disclosing information regarding the immigration status of any
individual unless required by the legal process or the individual consents
to disclosure.64 Furthermore, the city is prohibited from conditioning any
city benefits, opportunities, or services on immigration status.65
Mayor Rahm Emanuel, since he assumed office in 2011, has led the
city in pioneering a new series of immigrant-friendly policies. In 2012, he
introduced the “Welcoming City” provision to build off the existing
sanctuary policies and to specifically address federal civil detainers.66 The
provision prohibits city officials from arresting or detaining a person
solely upon (1) a belief that the individual is illegally present in the United
States, (2) an administrative warrant for a violation of civil immigration
law, or (3) an immigration detainer.67
The provision also goes a step further to restrict cooperation of city
officials with general ICE investigations. The provision states:
Unless an agency or agent is acting pursuant to a legitimate law
enforcement purpose that is unrelated to the enforcement of a civil
immigration law, no agency or agent shall: A. permit ICE agents
access to a person being detained by, or in the custody of, the agency
or agent; B. permit ICE agents use of agency facilities for
59. Kori Rumore, Chicago’s History as a Sanctuary City, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 13, 2017), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-sanctuary-history-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/
C6WN-LYJY].
60. CHI., ILL., EXEC. ORDER No. 85-1 (May 7, 1985); The Chicago New Americans Plan, CITY
OF CHI. 33 (Nov. 2012), https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Office%20of%
20New%20Americans/NewAmericanBookletfullplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/82FB-KKSG].
61. CHI., ILL., EXEC. ORDER No. 85-1 (May 7, 1985).
62. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 (2018).
63. Id. § 2-173-020.
64. Id. § 2-173-030.
65. Id. § 2-173-040.
66. Id. § 2-173-042.
67. Id.
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investigative interviews or other investigative purpose; or C. while
on duty, expend their time responding to ICE inquiries or
communicating with ICE regarding a person’s custody status or
release date.68

Thus, Chicago officials are prohibited from allowing ICE agents to
gain access to an individual in city custody, responding to ICE inquiries
regarding release and custody status while on duty, and allowing ICE to
use city facilities for federal immigration investigations.69 However, the
provision also includes a clause stating that city officials may
communicate with ICE to determine if a matter involves enforcement
based solely on a violation of civil immigration law.70 It further includes
an exception that the above restrictions on communications with ICE will
not apply if the individual has a criminal warrant, is convicted of a felony,
has a felony charge pending, or is a known gang member.71
Mayor Emanuel also created the Chicago Office of New Americans
(ONA), which is dedicated to immigrant integration and support.72 He
subsequently released the Chicago New Americans Plan, recommending
a comprehensive set of initiatives and programs to be implemented in
Chicago to support immigrant communities and to improve the city’s
overall economic and cultural growth.73
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SANCTUARY LAWS
The President’s legal challenges to state and local sanctuary laws
have drawn increased public attention. In the lawsuits, the Government
frames sanctuary provisions as infringements on the Executive’s
immigration power and the authority of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA). In opposition, the sanctuary jurisdictions assert that their laws
do not violate federal immigration law and are mere assertions of state
police powers. In such a highly charged and politicized debate, it is
difficult to discern which interpretation is most accurate.
In this section, I present an analysis of sanctuary laws under these
two frameworks. First, I explore the legal impacts of sanctuary laws on
existing immigration and constitutional law. To assess the impact on
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 940 (N.D. Ill. 2017),
reconsideration denied, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 5499167 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2017).
72. Office of New Americans, CITY CHI., https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/
provdrs/office_of_new_americans.html [https://perma.cc/7TVC-EYNM].
73. Office of New Americans, ONA Plan, CITY CHI., https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/
en/depts/mayor/supp_info/office-of-new-americans/ona_accomplishments.html
[https://perma.cc/
CJ8L-HWUN].
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existing immigration law, I will analyze which sanctuary jurisdiction
policy—Seattle, San Francisco, or Chicago—is most likely to survive a
challenge under the INA. I will then delve into the federalism issue and
determine whether sanctuary laws have any potential to change the Tenth
Amendment doctrine. Finally, I will address the political impacts of
sanctuary laws by embracing the theory that sanctuary laws are not
revolutionary creatures of law; they merely assert existing state police
powers. Ultimately, the analysis will reveal that sanctuary laws are most
powerful as political expressions of a local government’s morals and
values.
A. The Legal Impacts of Sanctuary Laws
1. Immigration Law
Sanctuary laws have, from their inception, allowed local
governments to establish protections for immigrants when state laws are
in disagreement with federal policies.74 In the present day, the widespread
presence of sanctuary laws across the country represents a unique shift in
federalism that challenges the federal government’s exclusive control over
the area of immigration. The following discussion of immigration law and
federal preemption regarding the Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago
policies will reveal that sanctuary laws can legally coexist with and pose
no threat to federal immigration law.
It is a long-standing principle that the federal government has plenary
power to legislate in the area of immigration. This plenary power was first
established by Chae Chan Ping v. United States, where the Court validated
the Chinese Exclusion Act.75 Policy concerns about the maintenance of a
uniform national immigration policy support the upholding of the plenary
power doctrine. Nonetheless, the plenary power of the Executive over the
area of immigration was created by cases motivated by racial animus and
xenophobic attitudes. Particularly, the seemingly pretextual use of national
security and foreign affairs justifications used in previous cases seems to

74. See supra Part I.B. (discussing sanctuary laws originating from localities seeking to provide
assistance to Central American refugees upon the U.S. government’s policy to deny the refugees
political asylum due to involvement in the Salvadoran regime).
75. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012)
(holding that immigration regulations surely fall within Congress’s plenary power); Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (“The Federal Government has broad constitutional
powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain,
regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their
naturalization.”).
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require further judicial scrutiny.76 Thus, even the circumstances under
which the plenary power doctrine was established may not be as infallible
as ordinarily thought. Even the Executive’s plenary power over
immigration is subject to judicial scrutiny for constitutional limitations.77
The Supreme Court, in the past, has been inconsistent in its application of
Congress’s plenary power over immigration in several cases where it
deemed federal immigration actions invalid on procedural fairness
grounds.78 Thus, despite claims of Executive plenary power, there is room
for state and local regulations to have some impact on immigration law.
This plenary immigration power grants the federal government
authority to enforce immigration law exclusively.79 The Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965 (INA)—also known as the Hart-Cellar Act—is a
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for immigration and
naturalization.80 The INA repealed the original national-origin quota
immigration policies.81 It has since become the primary means through
which the federal government exercises its immigration authority.82
The INA provision that is most threatening to local sanctuary laws
is, § 1373.83 Section 1373, titled “Communication between government
agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” prohibits state
and local governments from enacting laws that limit certain types of
communication with the federal government about immigration and
citizenship status information.84 Section 1373 states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,
a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization
76. Brief of Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, Holly Yasui, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for
Law and Equality, Civil Rights Organizations and National Bar Associations of Color as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 15–18, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010) (limiting the federal
government’s plenary power to deport by adding procedural requirements per the Sixth Amendment);
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (requiring the federal government to enact procedural notice
requirements before deporting undocumented individuals who enter pleas).
79. De Canas v. Bica, 42 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
80. Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Cellar) Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(codified as 8 U.S.C. Ch. 12).
81. Id.; Muzaffar Chishti, Faye Hipsman & Isabel Ball, Fifty Years On, the 1965 Immigration
and Nationality Act Continues to Reshape the United States, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Oct. 15,
2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/fifty-years-1965-immigration-and-nationality-actcontinues-reshape-united-states [https://perma.cc/P3BL-NEQR].
82. The statute now dictates the bulk of the work performed by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security. Chishti, Hipsman & Ball, supra note 81.
83. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (West 2018).
84. Id.
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Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status,
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.85

Also, government entities, in particular, may not be restricted or
prohibited from sending, requesting, receiving, maintaining, or
exchanging information regarding an individual’s immigration status.86
However, § 1373 does not compel local governments to comply with
ICE civil detainer requests. As a matter of law, civil detainer requests are
voluntary and local governments are not required to honor them.87
Furthermore, courts have deemed ICE civil detainer requests as
unconstitutional violations of the Fourth Amendment for detaining an
individual without probable cause.88 Laws restricting cooperation with
civil detainer requests can be interpreted as merely precautionary measures
to ensure that local governments do not violate the Fourth Amendment
rights of individuals under their custody.
The primary consequence for jurisdictions that violate § 1373 is
ineligibility for the Byrne Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program which
provides federal funding grants to states and localities for law enforcement
purposes.89 In 2016, the Attorney General made Byrne JAG funding
explicitly conditional upon compliance with § 1373.90 Many other federal
grant programs are also conditioned upon the general requirement of
“compliance with all applicable federal laws.”91 Section 1373 is currently
being challenged in pending lawsuits brought by several sanctuary
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2018); Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[S]ettled
constitutional law clearly establishes that [immigration detainers] must be deemed requests” because
any other interpretation would render them unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.).
88. See generally Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012); Galarza, 745 F.3d 634
(noting that local governments are not mandated to comply with federal detainer requests by ICE);
Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr.
11, 2014). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recognized the district court decisions
establishing that state civil immigration detainers violated the Fourth Amendment and accordingly
changed its policy. See generally Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., for Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir. of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Megan Mack, Officer of Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and Philip A.
McNamara, Assistant Sec. for Intergovernmental Affairs (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FR8FYG5F].
89. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, State of California
v. Sessions , No. 17-CV-04701 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31 2017) [hereinafter Opposition]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE (BJA), Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program, https://www.bja.
gov/jag/ [https://perma.cc/L545-DHGV].
90. Opposition, supra note 89; see Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., to
Karol V. Mason, Assistant Att’y Gen. of Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice Referral
of Allegations of 8 U.S.C. §1373 by Grant Recipients (May 31, 2016).
91. See Opposition, supra note 89, at 7.
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jurisdictions. President Trump’s Executive Order regarding sanctuary city
funding, Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ subsequent actions, and the
Government’s defenses in the pending lawsuits all rely heavily on § 1373
as valid grounds to invalidate or pre-empt sanctuary jurisdiction policies.
The constitutional doctrine of preemption maintains the generally
exclusive federal power over immigration law. This doctrine also prevents
state laws, here sanctuary laws, from impacting federal immigration law.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution asserts that “the laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”92 Congress thus
has the power to preempt state law through express federal legislation.93
Additionally, state laws can be preempted through field preemption and
conflict preemption.94 Field preemption occurs when the federal regulation
of a field is “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the states” to
legislate; thus, states are precluded from enacting policy in that area.95
Conflict preemption arises when “compliance with both federal and state
regulations becomes a physical impossibility.”96 To determine if a state
law is preempted by federal immigration law, the court will inquire into
whether the state law (1) attempts to regulate an existing immigration law,
(2) attempts to regulate a field already fully occupied by Congress, or (3)
conflicts with existing immigration law.97
A preemption analysis of sanctuary provisions reveals that they pose
no threat to existing federal immigration law and are well within the realm
of state legislation. The strongest argument for federal preemption of state
sanctuary laws is a combination of express and conflict preemption
by § 1373 of the INA. Field preemption is not an issue because the Court
has stated that there is room for states to legislate in immigration despite
the plenary power of the Executive.98 As such, a closer look at the language
of § 1373 and a comparison with the language of the sanctuary provisions
enacted in Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago will reveal their likelihood
of preemption.
Section 1373 prohibits state and local entities from preventing the
sending of information about an individual’s immigration status and the

92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
93. Marentette v. Abott Laboratories, Inc., 886 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Arizona
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012).
94. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416.
95. Id.
96. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
97. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
98. The Court stated that not every state enactment that deals with “aliens” is preempted by
federal immigration schemes. De Canas, 42 U.S. at 355; see Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142–43
(holding that it was within state police powers to regulate the employment of undocumented
individuals). See generally Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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receiving of information about an individual from ICE.99 First, consider
the operative language of the San Francisco sanctuary provision, which
states that no agent of the city of San Francisco “shall use any City funds
or resources to assist in the enforcement of Federal immigration law or to
gather or disseminate information regarding release status of individuals
or any other such personal information . . . .”100 It can be argued that San
Francisco’s broad restriction on the gathering of information conflicts with
the § 1373 language of “receiving information” about an individual from
ICE. If this section was considered alone, the provision would seem to be
preempted by conflict with § 1373.101 However, upon consideration of the
greater construction and application of the San Francisco policy, the odds
seem brighter for the city.
Taken as a whole, the San Francisco provision is more accurately
described as a “don’t ask” policy. The policy prohibition on “gathering”
information compared to the § 1373 language of “receiving” are
reconcilable because “gathering” is proactive while “receiving” is
passive.102 Thus, the San Francisco law only restricts local officials from
proactively acquiring information or inquiring about immigration status,
but there is no express prohibition on the passive receipt of information
from ICE, which would conflict with § 1373. Cumulatively, since the
policy bars any inquiry into immigration status, in practice the city would
not have any information to “send” to federal immigration enforcement.
Even if ICE requested information validly per § 1373, if the prohibition
on inquiry was properly followed, the city would have no information to
share. Thus, the San Francisco restriction on the “dissemination” of
information avoids conflict with the “sending” language of § 1373
generally. The only information the city possesses that may be of concern
is the release date of individuals from city custody, which falls under the
civil detainer and release notice provision of § 12I.3. However, this
provision provides guidelines for when city officials can respond to federal
requests for notices of release.103 Additionally, there is an anticommandeering concern with this provision, which will be further
discussed below.104 Implicitly, the ordinance thus does not prohibit the
passive receipt of information. It just restricts when state officials can
respond to those requests, an action that is not mandated by § 1373.105

99. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (West 2018) (emphasis added).
100. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2 (2018).
101. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 12, at 1701–03.
102. Id. at 1702–03.
103. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12I.3 (2018).
104. See infra Part II.A.2.
105. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12I.3 (2018); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (West 2018).
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Thus, it seems that the San Francisco provision could likely withstand a
preemption challenge.
In comparison to San Francisco, the Seattle preemption analysis is
simpler, and the Seattle provision is more likely to withstand challenges
because of its clear “don’t ask” approach. Since Seattle does not operate
any jails or prisons, the sanctuary ordinance does not contain a provision
defining the city officials’ involvement with civil detainers or notice of
release requests by ICE.106 As a result, the only possible conflicting
provision with § 1373 states “unless otherwise required by law or by court
order, no Seattle city officer shall inquire into the immigration status of
any person, or engage in activities designed to ascertain the immigration
status of any person.”107 This provision explicitly prohibits the proactive
inquiry by city officials into immigration status, but it is silent on sending
or receiving of immigration status information with ICE. It simply
embraces a “don’t ask” type of approach.108 Thus, it does not seem to be
within the same realm of § 1373’s regulation: the sending or receiving of
information.
Similar to the first provision of the San Francisco policy, in
application the city would have no relevant information to send to ICE. In
addition, the Seattle code includes a savings clause that “[n]othing in this
chapter shall be construed to prohibit any Seattle City officer or employee
from cooperating with federal immigration authorities as required by
law.”109 If there was any slim doubt as to the validity of the Seattle
sanctuary law, this statement clearly removes any concern about possible
preemption or any outright restriction of interaction with federal
authorities.
Unlike the Seattle and San Francisco sanctuary laws,110 the Chicago
law embodies a “don’t ask and don’t tell” policy. It explicitly restricts
cooperation of city authorities with ICE and prohibits not only inquiry into
immigration status but also disclosure of such information.111 Unlike the
other sanctuary laws discussed, the Chicago law contains a prohibition on
disclosure of immigration status information: “No agent or agency shall
disclose information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any
person.”112 Thus, a stronger argument could be made in this case that at
106. Daniel Beekman, Seattle Officials Welcome Judge’s Block of Trump’s Sanctuary City
Crackdown, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/
seattle-officials-welcome-judges-block-of-sanctuary-city-crackdown/.
107. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.18.015 (2018).
108. See Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 12, at 1701–03.
109. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.18.035 (2018).
110. See Id. § 4.18; S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12I.3 (2018).
111. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 2-173-030, 2-173-042 (2018).
112. Id. § 2-173-030.
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least part of the Chicago sanctuary law is preempted by § 1373. The
prohibition on “communicating with ICE regarding a person’s custody
status or release date”113 could be interpreted as restricting the “receiving”
and “sending” of information about an individual between city officials
and ICE.114 Although in application, this policy would function like Seattle
and San Francisco, where the inquiry restriction would essentially prevent
any dissemination. The inclusion of this explicit restriction on
“communicating” with ICE arguably conflicts with § 1373. The decision
to include “communicating” after already using the term “responding”
may indicate a broader reading of the term that prohibits not only
responding to ICE requests but also information sharing.115 Additionally,
the clause prohibiting disclosure, except under certain circumstances,
seems to restrict the sending of information to ICE as well.116 Further, the
disclosure provision arguably could be preempted, but the exception “as
required by law” (including § 1373), may be enough to carve out an
exception for § 1373 and avoid preemption.117
Ultimately, Chicago’s more comprehensive “don’t ask and don’t
tell” approach, restricting inquiry and disclosure of information, treads
closer to preemption than the other two laws discussed above. The safest
approach is exhibited by Seattle in its focus strictly on a “don’t ask” policy
without the inclusion of a civil detainer or notification request provision.
San Francisco’s law also has a good likelihood of withstanding preemption
even with inclusion of its civil detainer and notification request provision.
Notably, this analysis reveals that state and local sanctuary laws can
coexist with federal immigration law. Their existence does not conflict
with or pose any potential change to current immigration doctrine.
2. Constitutional Law: Tenth Amendment
Although the federal government has plenary power over
immigration, tension exists over what powers can be asserted over
sanctuary laws as creatures of state law. The Tenth Amendment provides
that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”118 As part of the Tenth Amendment, the anticommandeering doctrine states that Congress may not enact regulations
that directly compel states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
113. Id. § 2-173-042 (emphasis added).
114. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (West 2018).
115. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-042 (2018).
116. Id. § 2-173-030.
117. Id.
118. U.S. Const. amend. X.
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program.119 States must retain their ability to make independent state
policy.120 This allows states to remain accountable to their residents for
policy decisions and prevents state governments from being blamed for
federal policy decisions.121 The anti-commandeering doctrine prevents the
federal government from compelling state governments to take affirmative
actions to enforce or administer a federal program. But it has not, in the
most recent applications, prohibited the federal government from issuing
proscriptive restrictions on state governments.
Existing sanctuary laws may have the potential to expand the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment to include a
proscriptive element. A valid argument exists that § 1373 violates the anticommandeering doctrine because in prohibiting localities from placing
participation restrictions, it essentially compels enforcement or
administration of a federal regulatory program.122 Although two courts
have upheld § 1373 as a constitutional exercise of congressional power,
there is some room for a bona fide challenge to the constitutionality
of § 1373 to be successful.123
There is an opportunity for the Court, however, to expand the anticommandeering doctrine to allow states to prohibit voluntary compliance
in regards to proscriptive federal statutes.124 This move falls in line with
the policy of the anti-commandeering doctrine. In application, local
governments cannot comply with § 1373 and hold their employees
accountable for the policy decision not to participate in the federal
program.125 Thus, it seems that the local government is commandeered
by § 1373 because it “effectively thwarts” the ability of local government
to extricate their jurisdiction from involvement in the federal program.126
Additionally, as mentioned in City of New York, if a locality’s
sanctuary law generally discussed the greater confidentiality and privacy
concerns of information, then a stronger argument could be made
that § 1373 commandeers the locality against its own interest.127 However,
119. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
120. Id.
121. Plaintiff State of California’s Notice of Amended Motion and Amended Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 23, State of
California v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-04701-WHO (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2017) [hereinafter California’s
Motion].
122. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 39, Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-CV00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017).
123. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1373
was a valid exercise of power under the Tenth Amendment); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264
F.Supp.3d 933, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
124. See Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 949.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. New York, 179 F.3d at 31.
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in the absence of precedent, any change to the doctrine must be made by
the Supreme Court.128 In light of the challenges to President Trump’s
executive order, there is a possibility, although slim, that this change could
occur soon.
City of New York v. United States is the only case where the court
upheld the constitutionality of § 1373 under the Tenth Amendment anticommandeering clause.129 The case arose when the New York mayor
enacted Executive Order No. 124, a sanctuary policy. The Ordinance
prohibited city employees and officials from voluntarily providing federal
authorities with information concerning the immigration status of any
individual.130 There were exceptions in the provision allowing
communication with federal authorities when required by law if the
individual authorized the sharing of information or if the individual was
suspected of engaging in criminal behavior.131 If the information fit into
an exception, the Ordinance named only particular officers that made the
final decision on whether to alert federal authorities or not. Ultimately, the
court held that § 1373 does not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine
of the Tenth Amendment.132 Its decision rested on the premise that
proscriptive regulations, contrary to affirmative ones, do not compel state
and local governments to enact or administer any federal regulatory
program.133 The court stated that § 1373 does not “affirmatively
conscript[] states, localities, or their employees into the federal
government’s service.”134 Additionally, it does not directly compel states
or localities to affirmatively require or prohibit anything to comply with a
federal regulatory scheme.135 However, the holding is narrow
because § 1373 infringed on the New York executive order alone.136
The court left room for a decision involving “whether these Sections
would survive a constitutional challenge in the context of generalized
confidentiality policies that are necessary to the performance of legitimate
municipal functions and that include federal immigration status,” and
declined to offer an opinion on that matter.137 Thus, a challenge to the
proscriptive § 1373 by a city with a generalized confidentiality policy
128. Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d at 949.
129. 179 F.3d 29. In City of Chicago v. Sessions, in an opinion granting a preliminary injunction,
the court held that § 1373 seemed to be a valid exercise of power; however, the case is still in litigation
and no final decision has been rendered. 264 F. Supp. 3d at 949.
130. New York, 179 F.3d at 31.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 35.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 31.
135. Id. at 35.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 36.
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could be successful. In Chicago v. Sessions, currently being litigated, the
court has recognized that the “practical” impact of § 1373 is that “state and
local governments are limited in their ability to decline to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program.”138 Thus, there is potential that the
proscriptive nature of § 1373 compels state and local governments to
administer a federal regulatory scheme.
If formally recognized as such by the court, the decision would be a
groundbreaking evolution of the anti-commandeering doctrine, which
currently only applies to affirmative statutes. Sanctuary laws are wellsuited to lead this change because most provisions preserve the
confidentiality of personal information, including immigration status, and
may conflict with the compelling requirements of § 1373.
B. The Political Impacts of Sanctuary Laws
Sanctuary laws—originating from churches that functioned as
“sanctuaries” for asylum seekers139—have been motivated by a sentiment
of moral duty and ethical obligation.140 Today, sanctuary laws continue to
hold true to their origins and serve primarily as political symbols.141 The
laws send a message to the jurisdiction’s citizens and the rest of the
country denouncing anti-immigrant sentiment and policies. The language
in the purpose and preamble provisions of sanctuary laws make this
intention starkly clear. The policies assert the importance of immigrants in
the community and emphasize the need to maintain a diverse and inclusive
community within the jurisdiction.142
Additionally, the substantive content of sanctuary laws, for the most
part, seem to merely reiterate rights already protected within the state
police power or other constitutional limitations. The state police power,
protected by the Tenth Amendment, gives the state sovereign power in
determining the best approach to address crime and public safety.143 The
courts have recognized that state and local governments have a compelling

138. California’s Motion, supra note 121, at 24; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 618 (2000).
139. See supra Part I.A.
140. See Villazor, supra note 26, at 140–42, 147.
141. See id. at 155.
142. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 (2018) (“The vitality of the City of Chicago (the ‘City’),
one of the most ethnically, racially and religiously diverse cities in the world, where one-out-of-five
of the City’s residents is an immigrant, has been built on the strength of its immigrant
communities. . . . One of the City’s most important goals is to enhance the City’s relationship with the
immigrant communities.”); SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE No. 121063 (Jan. 28, 2003) (stating
“Seattle is a city comprised of immigrants . . . who contribute to Seattle’s social vivacity and cultural
richness”).
143. California’s Motion, supra note 121, at 22; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
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interest in maintaining a strong, trustworthy relationship with
undocumented and immigrant residents in their communities.144
Jurisdictions assert that the purpose of their sanctuary laws is to
improve trust between the local law enforcement authority and the
undocumented immigrant community to encourage victims and witnesses
to come forward in reporting crime and aid in investigations.145 In the
aggregate, by removing this obstacle for undocumented residents, the goal
is to reduce crime and improve public safety overall.146 A recent study
proves that this goal is, in fact, being achieved; sanctuary jurisdictions are,
as a whole, safer and stronger communities.147 The research showed that
in jurisdictions without sanctuary laws, where law enforcement agencies
frequently comply with detainer requests, it was harder for the local
agency to investigate crimes because victims and witnesses were less
likely to come forward due to the risk of detainment and deportation.148
Thus, the sanctuary law provisions that restrict compliance with ICE
detainer or notification requests and prohibit inquiry into immigration
status seem to be a valid means to the greater end of improving public
safety. This action regarding safety would fit within the accepted scope of
state police powers. In doing so, the primary purpose of sanctuary laws is
to send a message establishing trust between the local community and its
undocumented residents rather than make a substantive change to
immigration law.
Sanctuary laws, to some extent, create effective legal protections for
undocumented residents and other immigrants by protecting the collection
144. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 291 (7th Cir. 2018).
145. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE No. 121063 (Jan. 28, 2003) (addressing in the preamble that
the attacks of September 11, 2001 “left immigrant communities of color afraid to access benefits to
which they are entitled, for fear of being reported to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)”); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 (2018) (“The City Council finds that the cooperation of
all persons, both documented citizens and those without documentation status, is essential to achieve
the City’s goals of protecting life and property, preventing crime and resolving problems. The City
Council further finds that assistance from a person, whether documented or not, who is a victim of, or
a witness to, a crime is important to promoting the safety of all its residents. The cooperation of the
City’s immigrant communities is essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order,
safety and security in the entire City. One of the City’s most important goals is to enhance the City’s
relationship with the immigrant communities.”); Sanctuary City Ordinance, supra note 50 (explaining
that the ordinance was adopted to promote public trust and cooperation: “It helps keep our
communities healthy by making sure that all residents, regardless of immigration status, feel
comfortable accessing City public health services and benefit programs”); see also California’s
Motion, supra note 121, at 2.
146. See sources cited supra note 145.
147. Gene Demby, Why Sanctuary Cities are Safer, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/01/29/512002076/why-sanctuary-cities-are-safer
(reporting that on average counties that did not comply with ICE detainers experienced 35.5 fewer
crimes per 10,000 people than jurisdictions that did comply).
148. Id.
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and distribution of personal identifying information.149 However, these
protections are neither infallible nor comprehensive.
Sanctuary policies have failed. Despite the state’s sanctuary law, in
2017, the Washington State Department of Licensing (DOL) shared the
personal information of hundreds of Washington residents with federal
immigration enforcement agencies.150 Community organizations also
warn that sanctuary laws do not provide comprehensive protection from
immigration enforcement; ICE can still operate in churches, schools,
workplaces, and even homes.151 Local organizations still urge families to
remain vigilant and prepare emergency plans should they become detained
or separated.152 Nonetheless, sanctuary laws are a step forward in
protecting immigrant communities.
Overall, state and local governments do not seem to be making any
large-scale radical change in immigration law by enacting sanctuary laws.
Instead, they are using sanctuary laws to send a message of opposition to
harsh federal policies or a message of trust and commitment to diversity
and inclusiveness to their residents—and the federal government. Though
not impactful on substantive legal doctrine, sanctuary policies carry
significant normative influence simply because they are laws.
The traditional intent of legal regulation is to change behaviors by
changing collective attitudes among the community.153 Mere publicity and
knowledge of a law can curb discouraged behaviors and promote positive
beliefs about the moral purpose of the law.154 Further research is needed
to determine the exact efficacy of sanctuary laws on creating safe,
inclusive spaces for immigrants. Regardless, the message sent by cities,

149. See Nina Shapiro, Washington Department of Licensing Details How Often It Gave
Residents’ Info to Immigration Officials, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.
com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/washington-state-discloses-how-often-it-shared-information-withimmigration-authorities/ (“Every record shared by the Department with ICE represents a family that
has been or may be ripped apart by federal immigration authorities.”).
150. Id.; see also Nina Shapiro, Washington State Regularly Gives Drivers’ Info to Immigration
Authorities; Inslee Orders Temporary Halt, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.
seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/washington-state-regularly-gives-drivers-info-toimmigration-authorities-inslee-orders-temporary-halt/.
151. Know and Exercise Your Rights!, ONEAMERICA, http://weareoneamerica.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/Know_Your_Rights_Presentation_12_5_16pdf_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQ8BPTKG]; see also City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 281 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The federal
government can and does freely operate in “sanctuary” locations. And the level of refuge provided by
sanctuary cities is not unbounded.”).
152. Know and Exercise Your Rights!, supra note 151.
153. Jamillah Bowman Williams, Breaking Down Bias: Legal Mandates vs. Corporate Interests,
92 WASH. L. REV. 1472, 1481–82 (2017).
154. Id. at 1481–82, 1509 (describing the normative influence of law in the context of
antidiscrimination and civil rights laws).
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states, and counties declaring themselves as “welcoming,” “inclusive,”
and places of “refuge” is a powerful one.
CONCLUSION
Sanctuary laws have come to the forefront of immigration law
discussions in recent years due to recent concerns about terrorism and the
changing population demographics in the country. Bucking these
concerns, many jurisdictions have resisted xenophobia and opted to enact
sanctuary laws that restrict the use of local resources in federal
immigration enforcement. In an exploration of whether these sanctuary
laws possess more legal or political influence, my analysis concluded that
the primary purpose and influence of these laws is political in nature.155
Although the federal government—the executive branch in
particular—maintains plenary authority over immigration, state and local
sanctuary laws can coexist with federal immigration law. Sanctuary
provisions are unlikely to make any revolutionary change to existing
immigration law because of the restrictions set forth in § 1373 of the INA
and the doctrine of federal preemption. Sanctuary provisions must be
narrowly tailored to fit within the space untouched by § 1373. The best
approach would be a pure “don’t ask” policy, similar to Seattle’s.
Meanwhile, a “don’t tell” policy, like Chicago’s, that restricts disclosure
and communication with ICE, has a greater chance of being preempted
by § 1373.156 Sanctuary laws do have potential to expand the Tenth
Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine and prevent federal
proscriptive regulatory schemes. However, this does not seem to be their
main purpose.
Ultimately, the power of sanctuary laws lies in their political and
moral messaging. These policies symbolize opposition to current
immigration enforcement tactics and promote the values of
trustworthiness and inclusiveness among the community.157 They
represent a collective commitment to protecting immigrant communities
in the face of aggressive government action. By no means are these
policies perfect; however, they create protections for the some of the most
marginalized members of American society. It is my hope that this
Comment brings clarity to an area of public concern so heavily diluted
with misinformation. Sanctuary policies are at their core, as they were at
their origins, about preserving “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”

155. See supra Part II (discussing the dichotomy between legal significance and political
significance).
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. See supra Part II.B.
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for all members of society—a founding principle of the United States of
America.

